No other country in Latin America has as intense a way of doing politics as Bolivia. The official end of a 20-year political cycle, which began last Sunday, will soon enough prove this once again.
The process led by the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) goes back long before its 20 years in power. Under the leadership of coca growers’ union leader Evo Morales, it can be seen as the most successful grassroots political alliance and social movement instrument of 21st-century Latin America — at least so far.
That’s the reign that ended on August 17. The indigenous–farmer–union alliance that ruled the Plurinational State of Bolivia— as the country came to be officially known under the Constitution that rewrote Bolivia’s social contract in 2009—met its final stage of collapse with an astounding electoral defeat.
Although dramatic, the intoxicating mix of economic hardship and blunders, infighting, and political paralysis—hitting hard at the entire political process and policymaking—had already been a harbinger of this electoral outcome.
What numbers tell
We still have to wait until October 19 to see whether Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga or Rodrigo Paz Pereira will become Bolivia’s new President. Either way, it will mark a sharp political shift to the right for the first time in 20 years—discounting the 11-month dictatorship that emerged after the November 2019 coup.
Quiroga is a well-known figure in establishment, comprador-elite Latin American politics. The IBM executive and U.S.-trained politician has occupied all the classic seats to fit the bill: IMF, World Bank, and so on.
He is currently part of the activist former presidents meddling in every Latin American government that didn’t go Washington’s way, particularly through the Madrid Club—a sort of second-hand regional Davos for presidential has-beens.
A U.S.-loyal, low-budget hemispheric pressure group with no other purpose.
Rodrigo Paz Pereira made an unexpected breakthrough, emerging as the main front-runner. Hailing from a political family—the son and nephew of two former presidents—and a Senator with the Christian Democrat Party, Paz Pereira built his platform and profile on his tenure as mayor of the southern city of Tarija before becoming a senator, presenting himself as a successful manager.
Despite his progressive family background, a brand of middle-class populism allowed him to surpass Quiroga and the favored candidate, Samuel Doria, another old face also opposed to MAS.
Paz Pereira currently leads with 32.08 percent of the votes, followed by Quiroga with 26.94% and Doria with 19.93%.
It is only in fourth place that the first candidate from the left, Andrónico Rodríguez, appears with a meager 8.15%. MAS’ “official” candidate and Interior Minister, Eduardo del Castillo, fared even worse, finishing sixth with a mere 3.2%, behind yet another old face in Bolivian politics.
Spoiled votes appear to have reached 19.2%, making them effectively the third-largest bloc in the election—another key element. In over 20 years of electoral history, spoiled ballots had ranged between 2% and 3%. The reason for the unprecedented jump was Evo Morales’ call to spoil ballots as a form of protest.
Barred from running, Morales proved—at significant cost, though not entirely of his own making—to remain the most popular political leader on the left, with spoiled ballots concentrated mostly in rural and indigenous areas, especially in Cochabamba, Morales’ stronghold.
This picture, with no one reaching the 50% threshold to win in the first round, depicts the current political fragmentation across the spectrum, underscored by the dramatically poor performance and deep divisions within the MAS coalition—highlighting structural and willful political decisions that proved profoundly self-destructive.
The tragic essence
Until 2019, Bolivia had the fastest-growing economy in the entire hemisphere. The process was astounding.
By re-nationalizing strategic assets like hydrocarbons, along with other mineral and agricultural commodities, Bolivia grew at an average of 4.9% for 13 years, with strong public investment in roads and electrification, creating a comprehensive welfare network, and providing subsidies for education, fuel, and the elderly.
A wealth and land distribution policy reduced poverty (from 60% in 2005 to 35% in 2019, with extreme poverty dropping from 38% to 15%), bringing social and economic stability (the longest period in the nation’s history) and expanding the middle class to 58%.
Political successes notwithstanding, and always facing powerful and historically violent opposition groups closely tied to the U.S., Israel, drug cartels, and an actual hardcore neofascist tradition, none of these landmarks prevented a successful coup d’état in late November 2019.
In the wake of counting the votes that would have given Morales a first-round victory, unrest and fraud accusations emerged from the usual suspects.
An OAS report denouncing fraud enabled the final act of the insurrectionary process, which brought together a cabal of military leaders, Santa Cruz provincial elites—the most restive and hardcore opposition stronghold—Christian fundamentalists, and ever-opportunistic establishment figures. The MAS leadership was overwhelmed and ousted, forcing Evo Morales and his vice president to flee into exile in Mexico.
Nevertheless, the Morales government failed to recognize the warning signs already visible in the “color-coded” young, professional middle class that, on allegedly environmental grounds—based on misleading arguments during a year of extensive forest fires—mobilized.
Groomed by the NGO industrial complex, these groups and individuals set up a narrative of mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies by the Morales government—running for a “controversial” fourth term—that set the tone for the violent phase of November.
The 2019 coup in many ways resembled the one of 1980 and its immediate aftermath. Driven by an alliance of School of the Americas–trained military officers, big rural landlords from the eastern provinces, a powerful drug lord, and a neofascist militia organized by Nazi fugitive Klaus Barbie, the García Meza coup—like the November one—unleashed terror and persecution as the final official act of the Condor years.
Just as in the 1980s, the dictatorship’s international legitimacy was thin from the outset. With Senator Jeanine Añez as its mouthpiece, the unstable and chaotic cabal was unable to govern effectively, and the economy rapidly deteriorated.
In what can now be seen as the last powerful feat of the MAS cycle, Bolivia’s return to democracy came through ballots in the general elections held on October 18. With Morales leading from exile, the movement designated Luis Arce, the former economy minister—widely associated with the successful policies—who won with 55% of the vote, making a spectacular democratic comeback.
But many cracks were already showing. A very early rift between Arce and Morales set the stage for further conflict, infighting, and confrontation. MAS fragmented into factions—and factions within factions—such as Rodríguez’s candidacy vis-à-vis Evo, with the party splintering along what some describe as class lines.
The middle-class faction led by Arce and the grassroots campesino/indigenous faction led by Evo translated into mutual political blocking and sabotage at every level of the state. Evistas and Arcistas clashed in parliament, disrupting Arce’s attempts to implement policies.
At the same time, the Arce faction banned Morales from politics through legal and political maneuvers. An acrid struggle led to deep divisions. (Ollie Vargas’ account explains this in greater detail.)
Moreover, Morales’ hubris also played a role—not only in his conflict with Arce but also within his own base—by positioning himself simultaneously as leader of both the process and the government, blocking other viable options.
Neither Arce nor Morales built proper channels between them, and relations soured further. In a way, it resembles the Ecuadorian experience, with Lenín Moreno’s about-face on Rafael Correa’s political legacy and his alignment with the U.S.—though this final step, at least for now, has not been taken by Arce’s faction.
Perhaps class divisions, to some extent, explain the political fragmentation, but they become insufficient once mixed with personal motivations, circumstances, and external players.
The 2019 coup had backing from the U.S., Israel, and European countries like Germany. Lithium interests—Bolivia holds the world’s largest reserves—played a decisive role, underscored by Elon Musk’s infamous “we coup whoever we want” tweet.
An allegedly leaked audio of Debra Hevia, the current U.S. head of mission in Bolivia, reportedly stated in 2023 that they had been working for a long time to bring “real change” to Bolivia by strengthening “allies, organizations, and collaborators”—especially youth, whom they called “agents of change.”
For this scenario to succeed, she allegedly added, “Evo and Arce must relinquish power” in order to “close this chapter.” Will we see clearer signs of this coming from either the Evo or Arce camp—or perhaps from Andrónico?
In any case, along with political deterioration, the economy went downhill, with the classic features of depleted foreign reserves, inflation, and a parallel currency market. This poisonous combination led to hardship and struggles, driving the majority into political disenfranchisement and forcing them to focus primarily on their own subsistence.
What ‘s next for Bolivia?
Be it Spanish-born Paz Pereira or long-time U.S. resident Quiroga, some things are already certain. Landmark sociopolitical achievements enshrined in the Constitution will most likely undergo a—probably violent—rollback process.
This will certainly include Bolivia’s current foreign policy stance. A fierce critic of Israel—La Paz joined South Africa’s genocide case at the ICJ—and a defender of Palestinian rights; a key, dynamic Global South player, including through the ALBA alliance in the region, and recently a BRICS partner, all of this will be reversed, with realignment toward Westocratic structures once again, most likely taking an aggressive stance against non-U.S.-aligned countries in the region.
The same can be expected regarding domestic conflict. After two decades of indigenous, grassroots leadership, Bolivia will be pulled back to its previous setting. Late neoliberal reforms must be expected, along with further criminalization of everything surrounding Morales’ followers in the Tropic region and the Andes, including many forms of political and legal revanchism. Will actors from the Arce camp suffer the same fate?
On the other hand, Bolivia’s longer historical trend is not only one of upheaval but also of efficient and feisty organizing. No other country in the region has gone through so many confrontations ending in overthrows and government replacements, in a region historically plagued by violent coups and every textbook regime-change maneuver. After all, Latin America has long been a testing ground in this field.
So, overall, the main lines up to this point, sadly, are not hard to predict, at least in their basic features.
Bolivia lies at the geographical heart of South America—but also its spiritual one. A creation of Liberator Simón Bolívar in 1826, its uneven composition in many ways represents South America’s complex mosaic.
Ever a staple statement, this may also signal possible manifestations of highly effective resistance, if its instrument is able to withstand what is coming and endure another round of hardship and probable brutality. Very few nations have endured what Bolivia has and lived to tell the story.
One that, for sure, will once again prove both intense and extensive.
Diego Sequera is a writer and journalist based in Caracas, Venezuela.
Sources: Press TV and Radio Havana Cuba (RHC) / Resumen Latinoamericano – English
Join the Struggle-La Lucha Telegram channel