First published May 31, 2022

AUSTIN, TEXAS – Elon Musk’s proposed takeover of Twitter has ruffled many feathers among professional commentators. “Musk is the wrong leader for Twitter’s vital mission,” read one Bloomberg headline. The network also insisted, “Nothing in the Tesla CEO’s track record suggests he will be a careful steward of an important media property.” “Elon Musk is the last person who should take over Twitter,” wrote Max Boot in The Washington Post, explaining that “[h]e seems to believe that on social media anything goes. For democracy to survive, we need more content moderation, not less.” The irony of outlets owned by Michael Bloomberg and Jeff Bezos warning of the dangers of permitting a billionaire oligarch to control our media was barely commented upon.

Added to this, a host of celebrities publicly left the social media platform in protest against the proposed $44 billion purchase. This only seemed to confirm to many free-speech-minded individuals that the South African billionaire was a renegade outsider on a mission to save the internet from authoritarian elite control (despite the fact that he is borrowing money from the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in order to do so).

Musk has deliberately cultivated this image of himself: a real-life Tony Stark figure who thinks for himself and is not part of the established order. But behind this carefully constructed façade, Musk is intimately connected to the U.S. national security state, serving as one of its most important business partners. Elon, in short, is no threat to the powerful, entrenched elite: he is one of them.

TO UKRAINE, WITH LOVE

Musk, whose estimated $230 billion fortune is more than twice the gross domestic product of Ukraine, has garnered a great deal of positive publicity for donating thousands of Starlink terminals to the country, helping its people come back online after fighting downed the internet in much of the country. Starlink is an internet service allowing those with terminals to connect to one of over 2,400 small satellites in low Earth orbit. Many of these satellites were launched by Musk’s SpaceX technologies company.

However, it soon transpired that there is far more than meets the eye with Musk’s extraordinary “donation.” In fact, the U.S. government quietly paid SpaceX top dollar to send their inventory to the warzone. USAID – a government anti-insurgency agency that has regularly functioned as a regime-change organization – is known to have put up the cash to purchase and deliver at least 1,330 of the terminals.

Starlink is not a mass-market solution. Each terminal – which is, in effect, a tiny, portable satellite dish – has a markedly limited range, and is useful only in hyper-local situations. Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, estimated that the 10,000 Starlink terminals were allowing around 150,000 people to stay online.

Such a small number of people using the devices raises eyebrows. Who is important enough to be given such a device? Surely only high-value individuals such as spies or military operatives. That the Starlinks are serving a military purpose is now beyond clear. Indeed, in a matter of weeks, Starlink has become a cornerstone of the Ukrainian military, allowing it to continue to target Russian forces via drones and other high-tech machinery dependent on an internet connection. One official told The Times of London that he “must” use Starlink to target enemy forces via thermal imaging.

“Starlink is what changed the war in Ukraine’s favor. Russia went out of its way to blow up all our comms. Now they can’t. Starlink works under Katyusha fire, under artillery fire. It even works in Mariupol,” one Ukrainian soldier told journalist David Patrikarakos.

The reference to Mariupol alludes to the infamous Nazi group, the Azov Battalion, who have also reportedly been using Musk’s technology. Even in a subterranean cavern beneath Mariupol’s steelworks, Azov fighters were able to access the internet and communicate with the outside world, even doing video interviews from underground. In 2015, Congress attempted to add a provision to U.S. military aid to Ukraine stipulating that no support could go to Azov owing to their political ideology. That amendment was later removed at the behest of the Pentagon.

Dave Tremper, Director of Electronic Warfare at the Pentagon, sang SpaceX’s praises. “How they did that [keeping Ukrainian forces online] was eye-watering to me,” he said, adding that in the future the U.S. military “needs to be able to have that agility.”

ROCKETMAN

Such a statement is bound to get the attention of SpaceX chiefs, who have long profited from their lucrative relationship with the U.S. military. SpaceX relies largely on government contracts, there being almost no civilian demand for many of its products, especially its rocket launches.

Musk’s company has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts to launch spy satellites for espionage, drone warfare and other military uses. For example, in 2018, SpaceX was chosen to blast a $500 million Lockheed Martin GPS system into orbit. While Air Force spokesmen played up the civilian benefits of the launch, such as increased accuracy for GPS devices, it is clear that these devices play a key role in global surveillance and ongoing drone wars. SpaceX has also won contracts with the Air Force to deliver its command satellite into orbit, with the Space Development Agency to send tracking devices into space, and with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to launch its spy satellites. These satellites are used by all of the “big five” surveillance agencies, including the CIA and the NSA.

Thus, in today’s world, where so much intelligence gathering and target acquisition is done via satellite technology, SpaceX has become every bit as important to the U.S. war machine as more well-known companies like Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Without Musk’s company, the U.S. would not be able to carry out such an invasive program of spying and drone warfare around the world. Indeed, China is growing increasingly wary of this power, and is being advised to develop anti-satellite technologies to counter SpaceX’s all-seeing eye. Yet Musk himself continues to benefit from a general perception that he is not part of the system.

From its origins in 2002, SpaceX has always been extremely close to the national security state, particularly the CIA. Perhaps the most crucial link is Mike Griffin, who, at the time, was the president and COO of In-Q-Tel, a CIA-funded venture capital firm that seeks to nurture and sponsor new companies that will work with the CIA and other security services, equipping them with cutting edge technology. The “Q” in its name is a reference to “Q” from the James Bond series – a creative inventor who supplies the spy with the latest in futuristic tech.

Griffin was with Musk virtually from day one, accompanying him to Russia in February 2002, where they attempted to purchase cut-price intercontinental ballistic missiles to start Musk’s business. Musk felt that he could substantially undercut opponents by using second-hand material and off-the-shelf components for launches. The attempt failed, but the trip cemented a lasting partnership between the pair, with Griffin going to war for Musk, consistently backing him as a potential “Henry Ford” of the rocket industry. Three years later, Griffin would become head of NASA and later would hold a senior post at the Department of Defense.

While at NASA, Griffin brought Musk in for meetings and secured SpaceX’s big break. In 2006, NASA awarded the company a $396 million rocket development contract – a remarkable “gamble” in Griffin’s words, especially as it had never launched a rocket before. As National Geographic put it, SpaceX, “never would have gotten to where it is today without NASA.” And Griffin was essential to this development. Still, by 2008, SpaceX was again in dire straits, with Musk unable to make payroll. The company was saved by an unexpected $1.6 billion NASA contract for commercial cargo services. Thus, from its earliest days, SpaceX was nurtured by government agencies that saw the company as a potentially important source of technology.

NUKING MARS & BACKING COUPS

Like Henry Ford, Musk went into the automobile business, purchasing Tesla Motors in 2004. And also like Henry Ford, he has shared some rather controversial opinions. In 2019, for instance, he suggested that vaporizing Mars’ ice caps via a series of nuclear explosions could warm the planet sufficiently to support human life. If this was done, it would arguably not even be his worst crime against space. During a 2018 publicity stunt, he blasted a Tesla into outer space using a SpaceX rocket. However, he did not sterilize the vehicle before doing so, meaning it was covered in earthly bacteria – microorganisms that will likely be fatal to any alien life they encounter. In essence, the car is a biological weapon that could end life on any planet it encounters.

Musk also attracted attention when he appeared to admit that he worked with the U.S. government to overthrow Bolivian President Evo Morales in 2019. Bolivia is home to the world’s largest easy-to-extract lithium reserves, an element crucial in the production of electric-vehicle batteries. Morales had refused to open the country up to foreign corporations eager to exploit Bolivia for profit. Instead, he proposed developing sovereign technology to keep both the jobs and profits inside the country. He was overthrown by a U.S.-backed far-right coup in November 2019. The new government quickly invited Musk for talks. When asked on Twitter point blank whether he was involved in Morales’ ouster, Musk responded, “We will coup whoever we want! Deal with it.”

The South African has a long history of trolling and making inflammatory statements, so this “confession” might not be as cast-iron as it seems. Nevertheless, any hope of Musk profiting from Bolivia was shot after Morales’ party returned to power in a resounding victory one year later.

WORLD’S RICHEST MAN, FUNDED BY TAXPAYERS

In addition to the billions in government contracts Musk’s companies have secured, they also have received similar numbers in public subsidies and incentives. Chief among these is Tesla, which benefits greatly from complex international rules around electric vehicle production. In a push to reduce carbon emissions, governments around the world have introduced a system of credits for green vehicles, whereby a certain percentage of each manufacturer’s output must be zero-emission vehicles. Tesla only produces electric cars, so easily meets the mark.

However, the system also allows Tesla to sell their excess credits to manufacturers who cannot meet these quotas. In a competitive market where each manufacturer needs to hit certain targets, these credits are worth their weight in gold, and net Tesla billions in profit every year. For example, between 2019 and 2021 alone, Stellantis, which owns the Chrysler, Fiat, Citroen and Peugeot brands, forked out nearly $2.5 billion to acquire Tesla U.S. and European green credits.

This bizarre and self-defeating system goes some way to explaining why Tesla is worth more by market cap than Toyota, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, GM, Ford, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, and Volvo put together, despite not being even a top-15 car manufacturer in terms of units sold.

Musk’s company also received significant government backing in its early stages, receiving a $465 million low-interest loan from the Department of Energy in 2010, at a time when Tesla was on the rocks and its future was in doubt.

Like many giant companies, Tesla is able to play states off against each other, each job-hungry location bidding against the others to give the corporation as much free cash and tax incentives as possible. In 2020, for example, Austin gave Tesla more than $60 million in tax breaks to build a truck plant there.

This, however, was small fry in comparison to some of the deals Musk has signed. The State of New York handed Musk over $750 million, including $350 million in cash, in exchange for building a solar plant outside of Buffalo – a plant that Musk was bound to build somewhere in the United States. Meanwhile, Nevada signed an agreement with Tesla to build its Gigafactory near Reno. The included incentives mean that the car manufacturer could rake in nearly $1.3 billion in tax relief and tax credits. Between 2015 and 2018, Musk himself paid less than $70,000 in federal income taxes.

Therefore, while the 50-year-old businessman presents himself as a maverick science genius – an act that has garnered him legions of fans around the world – a closer inspection of his career shows he earned his fortune in a much more orthodox manner. First by being born rich, then by striking it big as a dot-com billionaire, and finally, like so many others, by feeding from the enormous government trough.

Perhaps more seriously though, SpaceX’s close proximity to both the military and the national security state marks it out as a key cog in the machine of U.S. empire, allowing Washington to spy, bomb or coup whoever it wants.

It is for this reason that so much of the hysteria, both positive and negative, over Musk’s ongoing purchase of Twitter is misplaced. Elon Musk is neither going to save nor destroy Twitter because he is not a crusading rebel challenging the establishment: he is an integral part of it.

Alan MacLeod is Senior Staff Writer for MintPress News. After completing his PhD in 2017 he published two books: Bad News From Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting and Propaganda in the Information Age: Still Manufacturing Consent, as well as a number of academic articles. He has also contributed to FAIR.org, The Guardian, Salon, The Grayzone, Jacobin Magazine, and Common Dreams.

Source: MintPress News

An internationalist warrior from Colombia, a member of the Communist Party of the Donetsk People’s Republic (KPDPR), a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth of the DPR, Alexis Castillo (callsign Alfonso), died under shelling from shrapnel wounds. He fought off the offensive of the Ukrainian Nazis on the village of Peski.

Alexis Castillo was born in Colombia and lived in Spain for a long time. Eight years ago, he came to defend the inhabitants of Donbass from Ukrainian Nazism.

Our deceased comrade was a convinced communist, a decent and modest man. Until the end of his life, he remained faithful to his duty as an internationalist warrior.

In Donetsk, Alexis is survived by his wife and son. We extend our condolences to his family and friends.

Everlasting memory!

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Donetsk People’s Republic
October 28, 2022

Translated by Melinda Butterfield

Source: Forward

The gloves came off at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on Mon., Oct. 17, 202,2 in one of the best bare-knuckle diplomatic throw-downs since the dawn of the new multipolar world on Feb. 24, 2022. And the subject was Haiti.

The United States is searching for a formula to justify its fourth major military intervention into Haiti in a century. To do so, Washington is playing fast-and-loose with the UN Charter, trying to deputize one nation or group of nations to intervene on its behalf. Sources say that the candidates for the honor are Canada, Mexico, and Norway.

However, veto-wielders China and Russia are pushing back, and there’s no guarantee that the U.S. (with its usual allies, Canada and France) will succeed in its gambit.

Brazil played the leadership role in the UN Mission to Stabilize Haiti (MINUSTAH), which lasted from 2004 to 2017. But that was a conventional UN “peace-keeping” mission authorized under the UN Charter’s Chapter 7, thoroughly directed by the UNSC.

What UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed in his Oct. 8 letter to the UNSC (S/2022/747) was an aberration, on two counts.

First, like its immediate predecessors, MINUSTAH and the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti or MINUJUSTH (which lasted from 2017 to 2019), any new mission would be a flagrant violation of Chapter 7, Article 43 which only authorizes the deployment of troops “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Haiti’s current trouble is solely an internal political struggle, not a conflict between two states, although Dominican Republic’s President Luis Abinader ludicrously claims that Haitian migrants and refugees crossing into the neighboring country are a threat to its “national security.”

Furthermore, de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry and his rump cabinet have absolutely no legitimacy or legal standing to invite foreign troops onto sovereign Haitian soil. He is merely a head of government, nominated but not sworn in by Haiti’s last elected head of state, President Jovenel Moïse, on Jul. 5, 2021, two days before his murder. Henry was shoe-horned into power two weeks later by the U.S.-dominated “Core Group” of ambassadors in Haiti. Moïse’s term indisputably ended on Feb. 7, 2022 (most legal experts say one year earlier), thus ending any legitimacy that Henry might have had.

Secondly, any Chapter 7 multinational military force deployed is supposed to be fully overseen and controlled by the Security Council. However, Guterres’ proposes that the UN pass the responsibility for military action to one country or group of countries, a formula that is nowhere in the UN Charter.

“The Security Council cannot ‘outsource’ a military mission,” explained Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, the first UN Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council. “The Secretary General can say whatever he wants but has no power. In this case, he is making an unwise proposal.”

In his letter, Guterres proposed a “rapid action force” made up of “one or several Member States, acting bilaterally [our emphasis] at the invitation of and in cooperation with the Government of Haiti, [that] could deploy, as a matter of urgency,… to support the Haitian National Police [PNH].”

He suggested two options for how to configure the force.

Option One would be a “multinational police task force” of advisors and trainers to “enhance the tactical and operational capabilities of the [PNH] to combat gang violence” while the PNH “would remain the only force on the front line of operational policing and anti-gang operations.”

Option Two would be a more aggressive “multinational special force” to support the PNH “in tackling gangs, including through joint strike, isolation, and containment operations across the country.” In short, a Special Forces hit squad.

Interestingly, the word “bilateral” is used six times throughout the eight-page letter of the multilateral body’s leader. This dovetails nicely with Washington’s Global Fragility Act (GFA), passed in 2019, which envisages the basing in Haiti of U.S. troops, using the State Department’s Agency for International Development (USAID) as a “humanitarian” cover, under a 10-year bilateral agreement.

To sell this ruse, Washington needs a bad-guy straw-man whom its white knights will slay. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield made the pitch:

“The draft resolution specifically lists Jimmy Cherizier, also known as “Barbecue,” as the subject of such sanctions. He is directly responsible for the fuel shortage that is crippling the country. By passing this resolution, we would take concrete actions to hold him and so many other violent criminals to account.” Cherizier is the foremost spokesman of the Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies, Mess with One, You Mess with All (FRG9), an alliance of crime-fighting armed neighborhood organizations.

Thomas-Greenfield further tried to sell the formula by saying: “This is also a direct response to Prime Minister Henry’s and the Haitian council of ministers’ request for international assistance to help restore security and alleviate the humanitarian crisis.”

Predictably, Russia and China pushed back.

“We would like to underscore that external interference in the political process in Haiti,” said Dmitry Polyanskiy, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN. “Subsuming [Haiti’s] interest to the interests of well-known regional players [a thinly veiled reference to the U.S.] who view the American continent as their backyard is unacceptable.”

He also noted that “many opposition groups call for not allowing a foreign intervention, and they rightfully refer to a not-very-successful experience, to put it mildly, with external interference in the country’s affairs.”

Finally, “we cannot support the attempts to quickly push through a resolution for this council on the sanctions either,” Polyanskiy concluded.

China also opposed a military option saying it had “taken note of the immediate opposition from some political parties and groups to the presence of a foreign armed force in Haiti, at a time when the Haitian government lacks legitimacy and is unable to govern.”

Haitians held massive anti-invasion demonstrations in Port-au-Prince on Oct. 17, the 216^th anniversary of founding father Jean-Jacques Dessalines’ murder. Many protestors waved Russian flags. In chaotic confrontations, Haitian police dispersed some of the demonstrators with tear gas. The same day, about 60 demonstrators walked down Nostrand Avenue from Eastern Parkway to Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn, NY to demand no intervention.

China did, however, express support for sanctions but gave no indication whatsoever that it agreed with Washington’s targeting of Cherizier, an anti-crime crusader. Cherizier’s call for a social revolution in Haiti is what alarms the U.S. and its allies in Haiti’s ruling class.

“China supports targeted sanctions including travel bans, assets freeze, and an arms embargo, among other measures, against gang members and their supporters,” Geng Shuang, the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN said, likely referring to the criminals grouped in a confederacy known as G-Pèp. It includes murderous gangs engaged in kidnapping, extortion, rape, and assassination like the Five Second’s Gang of Village de Dieu, the Martissant gang of Ti Lapli, and the Croix-des-Bouquets gangs of Vitelhomme and 400 Mawozo, which has publicized on social media the decapitation of its victims of late.

Cherizier has also recently denounced the collaboration of the PNH with G-Pèp gunmen who ride in their armored cars.

Part of the Haitian bourgeoisie’s and Washington’s campaign against the G9 is to say not only that it is holding Haiti hostage by blocking Port-au-Prince’s Varreux Fuel Terminal, but also by spreading rumors on radios and social media that the G9 is selling the gas for their own profit.

“It’s their attempt to discredit us and fool the masses into thinking that the G9 steals and sells gas,” Cherizier told Haïti Liberté on Oct. 17. “It’s how they’re trying to make the people not trust us, just like when they accused us of receiving 10 million [$81,000], or 43 million [$348,300], or 20 million gourdes [$162,000] from Ariel Henry. It’s just pure defamation.”

“The terminal is closed,” Cherizier continued. “It is barricaded by huge trenches we dug and empty containers. If one wanted to take the gas, how would one get it out? The huge amount of gas they’re talking about, how many recipients would we need to have to get this gas and transport it? They say that we overcame the facility’s security guards; let’s hear the testimony of the terminal’s security agents. The terminal has 70% of the nation’s gas; such a terminal undoubtedly has cameras. Let them show the footage that proves their accusations against the G9. What is sure: the gas will not leave unless, and only unless, Ariel backs down from his decision to hike the gas price, and returns it to what it was before. As long as he sets it at the IMF’s price, the gas will not leave. Unless he uses imperialism’s military force to retake the terminal.

“It is not by chance that every day the U.S. talks about the G9, but the G9 has never kidnapped or raped anyone,” Cherizier went on. “We have not blocked Martissant, which for a year and four months has cut off the capital from four [southern] departments. The G9 did not block Croix-des-Bouquets. But the U.S. target, the beast to be slaughtered, is the G9 because we, like the popular masses, are demanding real change, so that the living conditions of people living in working-class neighborhoods improve so they live decently.

“The foreigners will land,” Cherizier said. “Let them come! However, they will not only face Jimmy Chérizier but all the angry people of the ghettoes, seething in their working-class neighborhoods, who have nothing to lose and are ready to fight and die for their country.

“We have threatened the interests of the oligarchs, the wheeler-dealers, who destroyed our industries,” Cherizier said. “They only buy to sell. They closed [the state sugar mill] HASCO, which had more than 30,000 workers, the cement plant, and the flour mill, and kept the population in misery. Certainly the interests of imperialism are threatened! Let it happen! When imperialism arrives, we will stand up to fight politically and defend our lives.”

Russia and China may thwart Washington’s designs in the UN, but the U.S. may then turn either to the Organization of American States (OAS) or even an impromptu hemispheric coalition, as it did to invade tiny Grenada in 1983.

“I think they will send soldiers from the CARICOM countries with support from U.S., Canada, Mexico, [and] DR,” tweeted Dr. Jemima Pierre, a Haitian analyst with the Black Alliance for Peace and Black Agenda Report.

Source: Haïti Liberté

From November 18 to December 3, 2021, a NATO maritime exercise was organized by the French Navy (Marine National) off the Mediterranean coast and along France’s Atlantic seafront.

Code-named POLARIS 21, the large-scale simulation aimed to “mobilize all components of the French Navy, including its latest-generation assets, land and air assets from the French Army and Air Force, as well as combat ships and aircraft from France’s partner nations: the United States, Spain, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom.”

Billed as a “laboratory for tomorrow’s warfare,” POLARIS 21 was to be conducted around what was termed “high-spectrum” military actions, corresponding to the future missions of the French Navy in a hardened strategic context. It in turn completed the preparation of the naval air group before its next operational deployment, which began in February 2022.^[1]

The technical file for POLARIS 21 described “Mercure” (the Russian Federation) as the main threat in this war-game simulation.

“Mercure is a huge country straddling North Asia and Europe that forms a federation of 16 autonomous regions with no direct access to the Mediterranean. The legislative power is represented by a parliament of 400 deputies elected by direct universal suffrage for 5 years. There are several political parties all represented in parliament. The executive branch headed by the head of government appointed by the president. The president elected for 6 years. Current president Virgo Medvetine has managed to stay in power for 20 years and has silenced his main opponents. He advocates a strong Mercure and exacerbates the nationalist feeling of the Catharist people…

… Mercure’s foreign policy is expansionist. Leader Mercure seeks to reaffirm his country as a major player on the world stage, after years of self-effacement from the U.S. superpower. Moskulova (capital of Mercure) is today essential in the resolution of the crisis of Mercmania, which could lead to a civil war at any time. The President of Mercure does not hesitate to challenge the Western countries to which he blames the overthrow of the VIOLETA regime in 2011 and the support for OTSOE against the independence of MERCMANIA in 2015. Moskulova could intervene militarily to support the independence of this separatist territory. The ambition of President Virgo Medvetine is to restore the unity of the ‘Catharist world’”^[2]

The file goes on to describe MERCMANIA (Crimea) as:

“almost autonomous and the government of Otsoe (UKRAINE) does not really care because there is hardly any exchange with the rest of the country because of the Catharist community. The latter, completely infiltrated, by the mafias who take advantage of its geographical location outside the direct control of Mercure. The secret services of Mercure also use the enclave to settle a few miscellaneous cases outside of any jurisdiction. During the 2015 Mercmania crisis, Otsoe sought diplomatic and military support from Akitania, but with no real success. It was ultimately from the UN and the threat of action by a few members of the Security Council that restrained the ardor of Mercure, which obtained a status quo. It is now an autonomous enclave recognized only by Mercure since 2015. The Septime inhabitants driven out of almost the entire enclave and kept around the edges with Otsoe. As early as 2013, Catharist militias appeared, demanded autonomy, and refused to recognize Otsoe as an official language. The young Catharists refuse their incorporation into the army and join the self-defense forces set up by Mercure’s military secret service. In 2014, the Otsoe government attempted to negotiate a rapprochement with the Catharist majority. The self-appointed parliament of Montluqon (capital of Mercmania) refuses any discussion and officially calls for its attachment to Mercure. In 2015, Mercure paramilitary troops sent by 12 NATO UNCLASS RELEASABLE TO EXERCISE POLARIS 21 plane to Mercmania and established barbed-wire borders. Europe is sending observers who stationed in a sort of buffer zone near Saint-Yorre. Under international pressure, Mercure returns half of its troops and maintains a contingent of 500 men. Mercmania is the cradle of the Catharist royalty of the 9th century and of the orthodox Catharist religion.”

At this point, it is of interest for the reader to recall three notable elements:

a) The first involves the Western refusal to ever recognize the result of the referendum held in Crimea in 2014, which saw the local population vote overwhelmingly in favor of rejoining Russia.

b) The second deals with a naval agreement between Ukraine and the UK that was signed on June 21, 2021, which calls for the United Kingdom “to sell two refurbished Sandown-class mine-hunters to Ukraine and produce eight small missile warships for the country. The Agreement also calls on the United Kingdom to construct a new naval base on the Black Sea as the primary fleet base for the Ukrainian Navy and a base on the Sea of Azov. The agreement [further] provided for the sale of missiles to Ukraine, and for training and support for these.”^[3]

c) The last is an incident involving UK warship “HMS Defender” in the Black Sea on June 23, 2021 (two days after the signing of the above-mentioned naval agreement).

Wikipedia recalls the latter incident as follows:

“On 23 June 2021, the United Kingdom’s HMS Defender undertook a freedom of navigation patrol through the disputed waters around the Crimean Peninsula.[6]

In an account partially contradicted by the UK government, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and border guards said they fired warning shots from coast guard patrol ships and dropped bombs from a Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft in the path of Defender after, according to the Russian Defence Ministry, it had allegedly strayed for about 20 minutes as far as 3 km (2 miles) into waters off the coast of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014 in a move mostly unrecognised internationally. The UK military denied any warning shots were fired and said the ship was in innocent passage in Ukraine’s territorial sea, later clarifying that heavy guns were fired three miles astern and could not be considered to be warning shots….

On 27 June, secret documents relating to the passage of HMS Defender through Ukraine’s territorial waters were discovered at a bus stop in Kent. These documents revealed that the Royal Navy considered different hypothetical reactions from Russia in response to the ship’s passage and was prepared for the possibility that Russia may respond in an aggressive manner.” ^[4]

What are the implications of these events when viewed through the prism of the Russian Federation’s initiating of the Special Military Operation?

The West never recognized the reattachment of Crimea to Russia. It was therefore likely that, not unlike what is transpiring on a regular basis off the western coast of Syria, American Poseidon reconnaissance flights would have gained in frequency in order to probe the coast off the peninsula and supervise the movements of ships based in Sevastopol.

The naval agreement between Ukraine and the United Kingdom was to act as a tripwire. These “Ukrainian” naval bases in the Black and Azov Seas were likely going to be used as hubs for NATO ships to prepare an amphibious assault on the port cities of Odessa and Mariupol while Kyiv was massing ground troops on the western front lines of these regions.

Had Moscow ignored the quickly developing situation, it would have been forced to confront a situation which would have impeded its ability not only to prevent a genocide on its doorstep but also to preserve its own territorial integrity. With NATO warships allowed to roam in the area, time was of the essence and Moscow could not afford not to act.

The POLARIS 21 simulation under these circumstances was likely designed to prepare to engage the Russian fleet before it got the chance (as it did in Syria) to create a buffer zone in order to confront the incoming NATO fleet and thwart its amphibious operation.

This could help explain POLARIS 21’s stated goal of “winning the war before the war.”^[5]

1. Martin Manaranche, ”French Navy to Kick Off ‘POLARIS’: Its Largest Ever Exercise,” Naval News, November 16, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/11/french-navy-to-kick-off-polaris-largest-exercise/ ↑
2. http://eurasia-sever.by/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/nato-unclass-releasable-to-exercise-polaris-21-1.pdf↑
3. Alan Tovey, “Ukraine navy deal to boost British shipbuilding,” June 23, 2021, The [London] Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2021/06/23/ukraine-navy-deal-boost-british-shipbuilding/; Dan Sabbagh, “UK-Russian naval dispute: both sides will claim victory,” The Guardian, June 23, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/23/londons-recent-naval-deal-with-kyiv-will-add-to-russias-concerns; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signs-agreement-to-support-enhancement-of-ukrainian-naval-capabilities ↑
4. Lucy Fisher, “Exclusive: Dominic Raab warned MoD about Royal Navy’s Crimea plans,” The Telegraph, June 24, 2021, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/06/24/exclusive-dominic-raab-warned-mod-royal-navys-crimea-plans/; Paul Adams, “Classified Ministry of Defence documents found at bus stop,” BBC News, June 27, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-57624942 ↑
5. Paul Adams, ”Classified Ministry of Defence documents found at bus stop,” BBC News, June 27, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-57624942 ↑

Arnaud Develay is an international lawyer and participated in the defense of former President Saddam Hussein along with Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. In the wake of the Caesar Act, he documented the illegal sanction regime imposed on Syria while living in Damascus. Arnaud is now based in Moscow and can be reached at international.lawyer75@yahoo.com.

Source: CovertAction Magazine

The following article, by Marc Vandepitte and Jan Jonckheere, was originally published in Dutch on De Wereld Morgen. It explains the crucial significance of semiconductor chips to advances in modern technology, and goes on to describe the “chip war” currently being waged by the US government against China. The authors note that this is not the first time the US has attempted to suppress another country’s technological development, but they express significant doubt about the chances of success in this case. “In the past, the US has often succeeded in bringing countries to order and keeping them in line. However, whether it will succeed with China is highly questionable.”

Keith Lamb’s article Blocking China’s semiconductor industry is an attempt to impede the construction of socialism provides useful supplementary reading.

Recently, the US has identified China as its main enemy and is trying to thwart its economic and technological rise. Chips play a key role in this as they are the backbone of economic and military performance in the digital age. Whether the U.S. will succeed in its endeavor is highly questionable.

The key to the future

Technology is the key to the future. It is the basis for military might on the one hand, and economic productivity and a competitive position in the world market on the other.

Until recently, the US had an unassailable, dominant position on both fronts. The White House wants to maintain that hegemony at all costs, but the rise of China threatens to put an end to that.

According to US Presidential Security Adviser Sullivan, “we are facing a competitor that is determined to overtake US technological leadership and willing to devote nearly limitless resources to that goal”.

That is why the US has identified the People’s Republic of China as its main enemy and is trying to thwart the economic and technological ascent of this Asian giant.

Chip War

Semiconductors and chips[1] are particularly targeted. This makes sense because in the future geopolitical supremacy may increasingly depend on computer chips. Chips are integrated circuits that are pretty much the nervous system of electronic devices.

Until last century, military strength was based on firearms, warships, fighter jets, or (nuclear) missiles. In the digital age, chips are the backbone of economic as well as military performance.

According to James Mulvenon, an expert on Chinese cybersecurity, “the Pentagon has decided that semiconductors is the hill that they are willing to die on. The sector of semiconductors is the last industry in which the US is leading, and it is the one on which everything else is built”.

In early October 2022, the White House put its money where its mouth is. The Biden administration introduced sweeping export controls that will severely hamper Chinese companies’ attempts to obtain or manufacture advanced computer chips.

Under Trump, US companies were no longer allowed to sell chips to Huawei. Biden has now extended those trade restrictions to more than 40 Chinese companies, including several chip makers. The new measure effectively prohibits any US or non-US company from supplying those Chinese companies with hardware or software whose supply chain includes US technology.

The export restrictions not only target military applications but seek to block the development of China’s technological power by all means available. The strategy is to cut China off from the rest of the world in chip supply chains in order to deny it the opportunity to indigenize its semiconductor industry.

Paul Triolo, China and technology expert describes the new measure as a “major watershed” in US-China relations. “The US has essentially declared war on China’s ability to advance the country’s use of high-performance computing for economic and security gains.”

Conversely, the US is doing all it can to further increase its technological lead. For example, the White House’s National Science and Technology Council has just published a 47-page ‘National Strategy for Advanced Manufacturing’ that includes 11 strategic goals to increase US competitiveness in chips.

Geopolitics aside, the chip industry is also big business. The market capitalization of the largest listed chip firms now exceeds $4,000 billion. China spends more on computer chip imports than on oil.

Quest for allies

Although Biden claims to be eager to work with allies, this chip war is only initiated by the US. Experts admit that if other countries continue to supply China, the restrictions will have little effect. The only consequence then is that US chip companies will miss out on the large Chinese market.

In the past, the US already pressured other countries and regions to stop supplying high-tech products to China. In the case of chips, this mainly involves South Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, and the de facto autonomous Chinese province of Taiwan. With the new measure, foreign companies working with US technology are now supposed to act following US restrictions. They must seek US permission on a case-by-case basis.

Of course, foreign countries are not eager to comply with that, because China is a very important if not the most important customer. Samsung, for example, is the world’s largest builder of memory chips. Partly as a result of the new measure, this South Korean company expects 32 percent less revenue. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent these countries will seek and find possible loopholes.

Washington especially wants to bring Taiwan along in its isolation strategy. Taiwan accounts for 92 percent of the world’s high-value chips. For China, imports from Taiwan are economically and technologically vital.

It is in the context of this chip war that the provocative visit by Pelosi and other US politicians to the separatist leadership of Taiwan must be viewed. Mid-September, the US Senate approved a bill providing $6.5 billion in direct military aid to the island. Washington is putting pressure on China on several fronts.

Chances of success?

Chips are the main engine of electronics. China itself manufactures about 12 percent of global production. That is by no means enough for its own use. Only one-sixth of what it needs in chips is produced domestically. Moreover, for the time being, it is still unable to produce the most advanced chips.

In other words, in terms of chips, the country is highly dependent on imports. Annually they account for about $400 billion. If that supply were compromised, it would not only mean a very large economic loss, but it would also seriously undermine technological progress. In this sense, chips are considered the Achilles heel of Chinese industry.

To overcome that dependency and catch up with the technological backlog, China is investing more than any other country in this strategic industry. The country has already made serious progress in a number of areas. For example, it has successfully produced a 7-nanometer chip.[2] This puts it only one or two ‘generations’ behind industry leaders in Taiwan and South Korea.

But with these breakthroughs, it will remain dependent on imports of parts from other countries for the time being.[3] It doesn’t have to stay that way. Analysys Mason, a leading consulting firm, says in a recent report that China could be self-sufficient in chips within three to four years.

In any case, the US restrictive strategy will motivate the Chinese government to allocate even more resources and make breakthroughs. Asia Times gives the example of the 2015 blocking of the supply of Intel’s high-end Xeon Phi processors to Chinese supercomputer makers. A year later, Chinese researchers developed those processors themselves.

In the past, the US has often succeeded in bringing countries to order and keeping them in line. However, whether it will succeed with China is highly questionable. By the end of this decade, we will know whether the US attempt to wreck China’s chip industry has succeeded or failed.

Notes:

[1] Semiconductors are electronic components based on semiconductor material. A diode and a transistor are examples of semiconductors. In a sense, you can think of semiconductors as the building blocks of chips. Chips are integrated circuits, small in size. They are part of a computer or other electronic devices. In the mainstream media, there is usually no distinction between semiconductors and chips.

[2] The company in question, SMCI, is reportedly now working on even more advanced 5-nanometer chips.

[3] For example, China cannot make advanced semiconductor devices without EUV lithography equipment from ASML (Netherlands) and electronic design automation (EDA) tools from Synopsis and Cadence (US) or Siemens (Germany).

Source: Friends of Socialist China

In November 2021, a French military convoy was making its way to Mali while passing through Burkina Faso and Niger. It did not get very far. It was stopped in Téra, Niger, and before that at several points in Burkina Faso (in Bobo-Dioulasso and Kaya as well as in Ouagadougou, the country’s capital). Two civilians were killed as a result of clashes between the French convoy and protestors who were “angry at the failure of French forces to reign in terrorism in the region.” When the convoy crossed into Mali, it was attacked near the city of Gao.

Colonel Pascal Ianni, French Chief of Defense Staff spokesperson, told Julien Fanciulli of France 24 that there was a lot of “false information circulating” about the French convoy. Blame for the attacks was placed on “terrorists,” namely Islamic groups that continue to hold large parts of Mali and Burkina Faso. These groups have been emboldened and hardened by the 2011 war on Libya, prosecuted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and egged on by France. What Colonel Ianni would not admit is that the protests that followed the convoy revealed the depth of anti-French sentiment across North Africa and the Sahel region.

Coups d’états in the region have been taking place for more than two years—from the coup in Mali in August 2020 to the coup in Burkina Faso in September 2022. The coups in the region, including the coup in Guinea in September 2021 as well and the two other coups in Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), and another coup in Burkina Faso (January 2022), were driven in large part due to the anti-French sentiment in the Sahel. In May 2022, the military leaders in Mali ejected the French military bases set up in 2014, while France’s political project—G5 Sahel—flounders in this atmosphere of animosity. Protests against the French in Morocco and Algeria have only added weight to the anti-French sentiment spreading across the African continent, with French President Emmanuel Macron showered with insults as he tried to walk the streets of Oran in Algeria in August 2022.

Animosities

“The situation in the former French colonies (Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Mali) is different from the situation in northern Africa,” Abdallah El Harif of the Workers’ Democratic Way Party of Morocco told me. “The bad relations between the regime in Morocco and France is due to the fact that the Moroccan regime has developed important economic, political, and security relations with the regimes of West Africa at the expense of the French,” he said. About the former French colonies along the Sahel in particular, El Harif said that “many popular insurrections” had taken place against the continued French colonial presence in these countries. With Morocco distancing itself from France, Paris is angered by its growing ties with the United States, while in the Sahel region people want to eject France from their lives.

Morocco’s monarchy has reacted quietly to the coups in the Sahel, not willing to associate itself with the kind of anti-French sentiment in the region. Such an association would call attention to Morocco’s close relationship with the United States. This US-Morocco relationship has provided the monarchy with dividends: military equipment from the United States and permission for Morocco to continue with its occupation of Western Sahara, including the mining of the region’s precious phosphates (in exchange for Morocco opening ties with Israel). Each year, since 2004, Morocco has hosted a US military exercise, the African Lion. In June 2022, 10 African countries participated in the African Lion 2022, with observers from Israel (for the first time) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Morocco, El Harif told me, “has enormously developed its military relations with the United States.” France has been sidelined by these maneuvers, which has annoyed Paris. As he left behind the jeering crowds in Oran, Algeria, President Macron said that he would visit Morocco in late October.

In the Sahel region, unlike in Morocco, there is a growing popular sentiment against the French colonial interference (called Françafrique). Chad’s former President Idriss Déby Itno, who died in 2021, told Jeune Afrique in 2019 that “Françafrique is over. Sovereignty is indisputable, we must stop sticking this label of French backyard to our countries.” “The French control the currency of these states,” El Harif told me. “They have many military bases [in the Sahel region], and their corporations plunder the natural resources of these countries, while pretending to combat terrorism.” When political challenges arise, the French have colluded in assassinating leaders who challenge their authority (such as Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara in 1987) or have had them arrested and jailed (such as Côte d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo in 2011).

Why is Françafrique over?

In a recent interview with Atalayar, France’s former ambassador to Mali Nicolas Normand blamed the rising anti-French sentiment on “the repeated anti-French accusations of Mali’s prime minister and the virulent media campaign carried out by Russia on social media, accusing France of looting Mali and actually supporting the jihadists by pretending to fight them, with fake videos.” Indeed, Mali’s prime minister before August 22, 2022, Choguel Maïga, made strong statements against French military intervention in his country. In February 2022, Maïga told France 24 that the French government “have tried to divide his country by fueling autonomy claims in the north.” Malian singer Salif Keïta posted a video in which he said, “Aren’t you aware that France is financing our enemies against our children?” accusing France of collaborating with the jihadis.

Meanwhile, about the accusation that the Russian Wagner Group was operating in Mali, Maïga responded in his interview with France 24 and said that “The word Wagner. It’s the French who say that. We don’t know any Wagner.” However, Mali, he said in February, is working “with Russia cooperators.” Following an investigation by Facebook in 2020, it removed several social media accounts that were traced back to France and Russia and were “going head to head in the Central African Republic.”

In an important article in Le Monde in December 2021, senior researcher at Leiden University’s African Studies Center Rahmane Idrissa pointed out three reasons for the rise in anti-French sentiment in the Sahel. First, France, he said, “is paying the bill in the Sahel for half a century of military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa,” including France’s protection of regimes “generally odious to the population.” Second, the failure of the war against the jihadists has disillusioned the public regarding the utility of the French project. Third, and this is key, Idrissa argued that the inability of the military rulers in the region “to mobilize the population against an enemy (jihadist),” against whom they have no real strategy, has led to this anger being turned toward the French. The departure of the French, welcome as it is, “will certainly not resolve the jihadist crisis, ” Idrissa noted. The people will feel “sovereign,” he wrote, “even if part of the territory remains in the hands of terrorist gangs.”

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

En noviembre de 2021, un convoy militar francés se dirigía a Mali pasando por Burkina Faso y Níger. No llegó muy lejos. Fue detenido en Téra, Níger, y antes de eso, en varios puntos de Burkina Faso (en Bobo-Dioulasso y Kaya, así como en Ouagadougou, la capital del país). Dos civiles murieron como consecuencia de los enfrentamientos entre el convoy francés y los manifestantes “enfadados por la incapacidad de las fuerzas francesas para reprimir el terrorismo en la región”. Cuando el convoy entró en Malí, fue atacado cerca de la ciudad de Gao.

El coronel Pascal Ianni, portavoz del Estado Mayor de la Defensa francés, declaró a Julien Fanciulli, de France 24, que había mucha “información falsa circulando” sobre el convoy francés. La culpa de los atentados se atribuyó a los “terroristas”, es decir, a los grupos islámicos que siguen controlando amplias zonas de Malí y Burkina Faso. Estos grupos se han visto envalentonados y endurecidos por la guerra de 2011 contra Libia, llevada a cabo por la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte y alentada por Francia. Lo que el coronel Ianni no quiso admitir es que las protestas que siguieron al convoy revelaron la profundidad del sentimiento antifrancés en todo el norte de África y la región del Sahel.

Desde hace más de dos años se producen golpes de Estado en la región: entre el Golpe en Malí (agosto de 2020) y el de Burkina Faso (septiembre de 2022), se dió el Golpe de Guinea (septiembre de 2021), otros dos en Malí (agosto de 2020 y mayo de 2021), y otro más en Burkina Faso (enero de 2022). Todos fueron impulsados en gran parte, por el sentimiento antifrancés en el Sahel. En mayo de 2022, los líderes militares de Malí expulsaron las bases militares francesas establecidas allí en 2014, mientras que el proyecto político de Francia – G5 Sahel – se tambalea en esta atmósfera de hostilidad. Las protestas contra los franceses en Marruecos y Argelia no han hecho más que aumentar el sentimiento antifrancés que se extiende por el continente africano, y el presidente francés Emmanuel Macron recibió una lluvia de insultos cuando intentaba recorrer las calles de Orán, en Argelia, en agosto de 2022.

Hostilidad

“La situación en las antiguas colonias francesas (Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa de Marfil, Níger y Malí) es diferente de la situación en el norte de África”, me dijo Abdallah El Harif, del partido Camino Democrático de los Trabajadores, de Marruecos. “Las malas relaciones entre el régimen de Marruecos y Francia se deben a que el régimen marroquí ha desarrollado importantes relaciones económicas, políticas y de seguridad con los regímenes de África Occidental a costa de los franceses”, dijo. Sobre las antiguas colonias francesas a lo largo del Sahel en particular, El Harif mencionó que se habían producido “muchas insurrecciones populares” contra la continua presencia colonial francesa en estos países. Con el distanciamiento de Marruecos de Francia, París está enfadado por sus crecientes lazos con los Estados Unidos, mientras que en la región del Sahel la gente quiere expulsar a Francia de sus vidas.

La monarquía marroquí ha reaccionado en silencio a los golpes de Estado en el Sahel, sin querer asociarse con la suerte de “sentimiento antifrancés” en la región. Tal asociación llamaría la atención sobre la estrecha relación de Marruecos con los Estados Unidos. Esta relación ha proporcionado dividendos a la monarquía: equipamiento militar de los Estados Unidos y permiso para que Marruecos continúe con su ocupación del Sáhara Occidental, incluida la extracción de los preciosos fosfatos de la región (a cambio de que Marruecos estreche relaciones con Israel). Cada año, desde 2004, Marruecos ha acogido un ejercicio militar estadounidense, el León Africano. En junio de 2022, 10 países africanos participaron en el León Africano 2022, con observadores de Israel (por primera vez) y de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte. Marruecos, me dijo El Harif, “ha desarrollado enormemente sus relaciones militares con los Estados Unidos”. Francia ha quedado al margen de estas maniobras, lo que ha molestado a París. Al dejar atrás a las multitudes abucheadas en Orán, Argelia, el presidente Macron dijo que visitaría Marruecos a finales de octubre.

En la región del Sahel, a diferencia de Marruecos, existe un creciente sentimiento popular contra la injerencia colonial francesa (llamada Françafrique). El ex presidente de Chad, Idriss Déby Itno, fallecido en 2021, declaró a Jeune Afrique en 2019 que “la Françafrique se ha acabado. La soberanía es indiscutible, debemos dejar de pegar esta etiqueta de patio trasero francés a nuestros países”. “Los franceses controlan la moneda de estos Estados”, me dijo El Harif. “Tienen muchas bases militares [en la región del Sahel], y sus empresas saquean los recursos naturales de estos países, mientras fingen combatir el terrorismo”. Cuando surgen desafíos políticos, los franceses se han confabulado para asesinar a los líderes que desafían su autoridad (como el burkinés Thomas Sankara en 1987) o los han hecho detener y encarcelar (como el marfileño Laurent Gbagbo en 2011).

¿Por qué se acabó Françafrique?

En una entrevista reciente con Atalayar, el ex embajador de Francia en Malí, Nicolas Normand, achacó el aumento del sentimiento antifrancés a “las reiteradas acusaciones antifrancesas del primer ministro de Malí y a la virulenta campaña mediática llevada a cabo por Rusia en las redes sociales, en la que se acusa a Francia de saquear Malí y de apoyar en realidad a los yihadistas fingiendo que los combate, con vídeos falsos”. De hecho, el primer ministro de Malí antes del 22 de agosto de 2022, Choguel Maïga, hizo fuertes declaraciones contra la intervención militar francesa en su país. En febrero de 2022, Maïga declaró a France 24 que el Gobierno francés “ha intentado dividir su país alimentando las reivindicaciones de autonomía en el norte”. El cantante maliense Salif Keïta publicó un vídeo en el que decía: “¿No sois conscientes de que Francia financia a nuestros enemigos contra nuestros hijos?”, acusando a Francia de colaborar con los yihadistas.

Mientras tanto, sobre la acusación de que el grupo ruso Wagner estaba operando en Malí, Maïga respondió en una entrevista con France 24, diciendo que “La palabra Wagner… son los franceses los que dicen eso. Nosotros no conocemos a ningún Wagner”. Sin embargo, en febrero dijo que Malí estaba trabajando “con cooperadores de Rusia”. A raíz de una investigación realizada por Facebook en 2020, la compañía eliminó varias cuentas falsas que rastreadas conducían a Francia y Rusia y que “estaban compitiendo reñidamente en la República Centroafricana”.

En un importante artículo publicado en Le Monde en diciembre de 2021, el investigador principal del Centro de Estudios Africanos de la Universidad de Leiden, Rahmane Idrissa, señaló tres razones para el aumento del sentimiento antifrancés en el Sahel. En primer lugar, Francia, dijo, “está pagando la factura en el Sahel por medio siglo de intervenciones militares en el África subsahariana”, incluyendo la protección de Francia a regímenes “generalmente odiosos para la población”. En segundo lugar, el fracaso de la guerra contra los yihadistas ha desilusionado a la opinión pública respecto a la utilidad del proyecto francés. En tercer lugar, y esto es clave, Idrissa argumentó que la incapacidad de los gobernantes militares de la región “para movilizar a la población contra un enemigo (los yihadistas)”, contra el que no tienen ninguna estrategia real, ha hecho que esta ira se dirija hacia los franceses. La salida de los franceses, por muy bienvenida que sea, “no resolverá ciertamente la crisis yihadista”, señaló Idrissa. El pueblo se sentirá “soberano”, escribió, “aunque una parte del territorio siga en manos de las bandas terroristas”.

Este artículo fue producido para Globetrotter. Vijay Prashad es un historiador, editor y periodista indio. Es miembro de la redacción y corresponsal en jefe de Globetrotter. Es editor en jefe de LeftWord Books y director del Instituto Tricontinental de Investigación Social. También es miembro senior no-residente del Instituto Chongyang de Estudios Financieros de la Universidad Renmin de China. Ha escrito más de 20 libros, entre ellos The Darker Nations y The Poorer Nations. Sus últimos libros son Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism y The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power (con Noam Chomsky).

A general strike was called for by Palestinian political movements across the occupied West Bank, The New Arab reported. Businesses and institutions were closed in response to the call to strike in all major West Bank cities, including Ramallah.

“As soon as the news broke about the Israeli raid, many of us in Jenin headed to Nablus to stand beside our people there,” Atta Abu Rmeileh, secretary of the Fatah faction in the Jenin refugee camp, told The New Arab.

“There were large crowds of people at the Rafidia hospital, where Wadee al-Hawah was taken, among whom were many members of the Palestinian security forces who were all mobilized to confront any attempt by the occupation forces to reach the hospital,” Abu Rmeileh remarked.

“It was a scene of unity between residents, security forces and resistance fighters, as the whole city was targeted.”

Meanwhile, Palestinian fighters attacked the Israeli checkpoints of Salem and Jalamah outside Jenin. In a statement, the ‘Jenin brigade’ said that dozens of its members opened fire at the Israeli positions in support of the ‘Lions’ Den.’

More shootings at Israeli forces were reported at the Qalandia checkpoint and outside the town of Abu Dis, near Jerusalem.

In a statement, the ‘Lions’ Den’ group threatened Israel on Sunday with more armed actions against its forces.

“Besiege everywhere now, unleash your drones and your spies, for we have prepared a fire for you,” the statement read.

The ‘Lions’ Den’ statement came following the killing of 33-year-old Tamer Kilani in an explosion inside Nablus’ old city. The group accused Israel of being behind the killing, describing Kilani as “one of its fiercest fighters.”

Source: Palestine Chronicle

Alabama – Prisoners in Alabama announced on Oct. 14 that they had paused their historic three-week work stoppage. The strike, which started Sept. 26, involved thousands of prisoners throughout the state, causing the breakdown of normal operations at most major male prisons this month.

According to organizers, the strike’s end was announced following a protest at the state capitol in Montgomery hosted by Both Sides of the Wall. Diyawn Caldwell, founder of the prisoner advocacy group, explained that the strike may only be on pause, depending upon the government’s response.

“It’s been a collective effort from us on the outside and those on the inside that are organizing the strike to put it on hold to give the state, the governor, and the department of corrections time to address our grievances and concerns surrounding our demands,” said Caldwell. “If those grievances have not been addressed within an appropriate amount of time, we will resume the strike.”

Unicorn Riot interviewed Diyawn Caldwell and Christina Horvat, who is also with Both Sides of the Wall. They provided an intimate and in-depth look into the Alabama prison system:

On Oct. 18, the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) confirmed that the prison work strike was over.

Strikers decided to put their protest on hold, in part, due to the impact that reduced caloric intake was having on prisoners with medical issues such as diabetes. During the strike, the ADOC reduced meal portions dramatically, feeding prisoners about 1000 calories or less per day.

“Our brothers, particularly those with health conditions, addiction and mental health challenges, have faced challenges not only to their psychological well-being but also their very lives,” strikers wrote in a public statement. “Especially alarming is ADOC’S intentional ‘bird feeding’ food [deprivation], which presents a severe health risk to those who suffer from diabetes and other illnesses that require a wellness diet.”

“Unlike the ADOC,” they wrote, “we value life.”

The Alabama Department of Corrections admitted at the beginning of the strike that their reliance on free prisoner labor meant that the strike had severely disrupted their ability to run their facilities.

In response to the reduction in food portions, attorneys representing more than 35 Alabama prisoners filed a motion in federal court on Oct. 7 requesting that a federal judge grant immediate injunctive relief to the strikers. The motion, which was filed in an ongoing federal lawsuit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against the Alabama Department of Corrections, claimed that the effect on the prisoners of the “bird feeding” “has been injurious, and their medical and psychological conditions will continue to deteriorate as their bodies are affected by inadequate dietary and medical access.”

“Some Plaintiff-Intervenors have lost a dangerous amount of body mass,” the motion reads. Prisoners “have had blood sugar drop to dangerous levels, and have experienced other acute medical symptoms (e.g., nausea) as a direct result of Defendants’ decisions to reduce calories and meal frequency.”

Judge R. David Proctor has yet to rule on the motion, although the Department of Justice has filed a motion in court opposing the prisoners’ attempt to intervene in the case, claiming that taking on additional considerations at this time would slow down the progress of the overall case.

The inhumane conditions in Alabama prisons have been extensively documented, including in a 2019 Department of Justice report that found that the ADOC “does not reasonably protect prisoners from rampant violence” and sexual abuse, and that conditions in Alabama prisons “violate the Constitution.”

Alabama Governor Kay Ivey’s solution to the ongoing crisis within the Alabama prison system is to use coronavirus federal relief funds to build three new prisons in her state. Ivey’s plan involves using up to $400 million of American Rescue Plan coronavirus relief funds on prison projects, according to the Associated Press.

Prisoners and their advocates have pushed back against this plan, claiming that building more prisons is not the solution to mass incarceration in Alabama.

The recent federal court motion in defense of the striking prisoners echoed these criticisms: “The Defendants and their affiliates are using this litigation to justify enormous expenditures on physical infrastructure, much of which is undoubtedly in poor repair (and practically all of which is unairconditioned, moldy and dilapidated, making recruitment of correctional officers difficult, especially at relatively low levels of pay).”

“As a result, the money that Defendants would use to hire correctional officers (not to mention feed or medicate prisoners) is going or will go to build new prisons that may improve conditions in the distant future, rather than to ameliorate the cruel and unusual punishment immediately at hand.”

Motion for Leave to Intervene

Incarcerated prisoner rights activist Kinetik Justice below told Unicorn Riot that during the first week of the labor strike, he was beaten by correctional officers and subsequently placed in solitary confinement:

When the strike was put on hold on October 14, strikers released a statement explaining why at least some prisoners were deciding to return to work. “Since the peaceful labor strike within the Alabama Department of Corrections began on September 26,” the statement reads. “Those who are striking have faced relentless attempts to break our spirit by the correctional staff.”

“We have been starved, placed into solitary confinement and suicide cells as retaliation, and forced into dangerous situations as ADOC tries to turn us against each other…The world is watching.”

Striking prisoners’ statement on Oct. 14

Organizers with Both Sides of the Wall say that the struggle is far from over. “We’re going to continue to fight,” said Caldwell. “It’s going to take the death of me if that’s what they’re looking for. We’ll fight tooth and nail.”

Source: Unicorn Riot

We are very pleased to publish below an interview with Carlos Miguel Pereira Hernández, Cuba’s ambassador to China, conducted by People’s Daily and published in Chinese on 13 October. The unabridged English translation has been provided to us by the Cuban Embassy in Beijing.

Timed to coincide with the 62nd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba and the People’s Republic of China, the interview gives an overview of the history and contemporary reality of relations between the two countries.

Noting that revolutionary Cuba was the first country in the Western hemisphere to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China – in 1960, just a year after the 26th of July Movement came to power – Pereira references the role played by Chinese immigrants in Cuba’s independence struggle. He points out that Cuba and China consider themselves “mutual referents in the construction of socialism with our own characteristics” and notes that President Miguel Díaz-Canel describes Cuba-China ties as “paradigmatic”, and President Xi Jinping describes them as those of “good friends, good comrades and good brothers”.

Describing the cooperation between China and Cuba fields in a vast array of fields, Comrade Pereira expresses confidence that the relationship will continue to deepen.

– Friends of Socialist China

This year marks the 62nd anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Cuba, how do you assess the fraternal friendship between the two countries? What are your specific plans to further promote economic, trade and people-to-people exchanges between the two countries?     

Relations between Cuba and China were made official on September 28, 1960, a formal step after the announcement by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro a few days earlier in front of more than a million Cubans, in the context of the historic First Declaration of Havana, to recognize the New China and rescind ties with Taiwan. That just decision was born of the political and popular will that have accompanied our relations throughout these 62 years.

The nascent Cuban Revolution definitively broke with the Monroe Doctrine and blind obedience to Washington, allowing Cuba to become the first country in the entire Western Hemisphere to establish ties with New China. We are honored to have made that modest contribution as one of the first manifestations of independence from our foreign policy.

The historical foundations and deep bonds of friendship between our peoples go back to the arrival of those first Chinese immigrants 175 years ago, who also had an outstanding and glorious participation in our struggles for independence.

Throughout these years of uninterrupted relations, Cuba has had the historic privilege of always being in the front row in promoting exchanges with China. Our relations represent a model of cooperation based on equality, respect and mutual benefit. We consider ourselves mutual referents in the construction of socialism with our own characteristics and on that basis, we carry out a broad and systematic exchange of experiences.

Our bilateral relations, as we reach the 62nd anniversary of diplomatic relations, are accurate and broadly in line with the definitions given in this regard by our top leaders. In the words of President Miguel Díaz-Canel, the ties between Cuba and China are paradigmatic, and President Xi Jinping has described our bonds as those of good friends, good comrades and good brothers.

The special character of our bilateral ties is a historic consensus, which reaches today an unprecedented solidity, by virtue of the high level of political mutual trust, the broad coincidence of positions in the international arena and the multidimensional and full development of our ties.

In the last two years, even in the midst of the pandemic, our ties continued to grow, the mechanisms of inter-party dialogue, government, parliamentarians and thus of various sectors, continued to strengthen in pursuit of coordination and cooperation both bilaterally and in international organizations.

It can be said that Cuba and China have been fraternal countries, which have supported each other on core issues and, above all, in difficult times. Since our official ties were established, Cuba has always shown its unequivocal support for the “One China” policy, and the firm rejection of any action that threatens China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. For our part, we have counted on the sustained support from the Chinese government and people, and in particular, in our fight against U.S. blockade, which continues to intensify even in times of pandemic.

On September 24, in the framework of the 77th Session of the General Debate of the United Nations, State Councilor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, in a historic and unprecedented pronouncement, requested for the first time in that important scenario, the lifting and immediate end of the genocidal blockade policy. This transcendental support from China becomes a new milestone in our bilateral relations that ratifies the special and exceptional character of our ties, as well as mutual support on core issues.

Our ties have had a multidimensional growth, including the integral development of economic, commercial and financial ties. Despite the differences in terms of volume and productive capacity, the complementarity of our economies and the excellent political environment in which they develop, confirm the enormous potential to be exploited in this area.

Today, our ties cover almost all sectors of the economy of both countries. China continues to be Cuba’s second largest trading partner, a fundamental source of financing on favorable terms and the main technological supplier for the execution of projects prioritized for the economic and social development of our country.

China has also consolidated as the main market for our exports of goods. Sugar, nickel, rum and tobacco are emblematic products with great acceptance and demand in the Chinese market, for their good quality and recognition in the international market. New items have been added in recent years and others represent very promising prospects such as lobster, white and sea shrimp, coffee, honey and biotechnology products.

Likewise, we are inserted in new business models such as cross-border electronic commerce, through the creation of the Cuban Pavilion “Cuban Excellences” on JD.com Group platform. This has also been part of strategy of deepening our relations with China and a new milestone in bilateral cooperation, allowing the introduction of more Cuban products to this market, as well as a greater promotion of Cuba’s image, through its tourist and cultural resources.

It is worth mentioning as a milestone in our economic ties, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in 2018 and subsequently the Action Plan for the joint construction of the “Belt and Road”. Under this initiative, we hope to promote new projects linked to tourism, renewable energies, communications with the Digital Silk Road, health, biotechnology and science and technology.

In this context, an important area for cooperation is foreign investment in which China has much to contribute in the development of Sino-Cuban investments in Cuba, especially in the development of infrastructure such as airports, ports, roads, tourism infrastructure, telecommunications, as well as in projects related to renewable energies, biotechnology and health.

It is also of great interest to promote cooperation in the biotechnology sector between Cuban scientific entities and Chinese companies and to promote cooperation in this area, through the models that we are developing today in China, such as joint ventures.

Similarly, and taking into account that China promotes and encourages domestic consumption of high-quality products, we believe that the export of Cuban products to the Asian giant is also an area of potential for cooperation.

Another sector with promise is the export of Cuban medical services. In this regard, our exchanges with Chinese counterparts have transcended broad interests in cooperating in specialties such as oncology, ophthalmology, primary health care, health and wellness tourism and the possibility of applying the innovative products of Cuban biotechnology, which have great impact and recognition at the international level.

People-to-people exchanges are fluid and close, highlighting the close historical and cultural links. There is an increasing interest in Cuba to know the culture and language of China, while, to cite just two examples, the learning of the Spanish language and Cuban salsa, are gaining more and more followers in China. On the other hand, Cuba is a safe destination and could be the gateway for Chinese tourism to the Caribbean.

The Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of Cuba are the leading nucleus of their countries’ respective socialist causes. How do you see the inter-party exchanges and cooperation between Cuba and China? What do you think is the greatest contribution made by the Communist Party of China to world political civilization in the last decade?

The relations between the Communist Party of Cuba and the Communist Party are forged on the basis of numerous affinities and consensuses, and also by the common challenge of building socialism based on different national realities, in the midst of a complex international situation characterized by growing unilateralism and the hegemonic attempt to impose on us the patterns and models of others.

The fluid inter-party dialogue throughout these 62 years, together with the frequent exchange of experiences in the construction of socialism, according to the conditions of each country, constitute essential pillars of the solid mutual trust that exists.

The recent exchanges between the party structures of both countries have been projected towards the implementation of the consensus reached between First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez and Secretary General Xi Jinping, from a face-to-face meeting they had in Beijing in 2018 and the two telephone calls held after the beginning of the pandemic.

This year we celebrate the virtual IV Theoretical Seminar between both Communist Parties that strengthens the practice of the exchange of experiences in socialist construction.  In this context, the messages of both leaders were relevant, ratifying the utmost importance that both countries attach to strengthening the Parties in pursuit of the consolidation of strategic communication and political trust at the highest level.

On the other hand, the Communist Party of China has been central to the achievements of the New China, so it is of great importance in the international arena, for socialist countries such as Cuba and for left-wing and progressive movements.

The CPC was able to innovate Marxist theory by adjusting it to China’s own characteristics, which constitutes a valuable contribution to the study, dissemination and promotion of Marxism in the twenty-first century. The process of “sinicization” of Marxism is an example of the application of materialist dialectics, achieving a socioeconomic model, whose successes are undeniable.  The feat of eradicating extreme poverty in China is a tangible demonstration of the accurate leadership of the party organization.

For Cuba, China constitutes a benchmark of the conquests of socialism in modern times, which, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, has managed to overcome adversities and meet development goals such as the revitalization of the nation.

In this regard, the holding of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of China will be a historic moment, to which we will pay maximum attention and follow-up. Cuba wishes China success in celebrating this momentous event. We are convinced that as a result of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of China we will find a strengthened China, determined to maintain its conquests, to build socialism, and to fulfill its second centennial goal.

The strengthening of inter-party exchange will continue at the end of the XX Congress, because it will be a favorable moment to promote new spaces for bilateral dialogue, based on the exchange of experiences, consultation and support in regional and international forums.